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Special Needs Search
Under the Fourth
Amendment? What
Should (and Will) the
Supreme Court Do?
Tracey Maclin

I. Introduction
In the past twenty years, advances in forensic DNA
technology have revolutionized the American criminal justice system.1 The use of forensic DNA testing in
America began in 1987, and its demonstrated scientiﬁc
accuracy quickly led jurisdictions to accept expert testimony regarding DNA matches between suspects and
crime scene evidence.2 Wielding the power to exonerate
the innocent and apprehend the guilty, the use of DNA
identiﬁcation technology has become an indispensable
resource for prosecutors and law enforcement ofﬁcials,
as well as for defense lawyers representing persons
falsely accused or wrongfully convicted of crimes they
did not commit. As states began to compile DNA proﬁles from convicted offenders, the need for a repository
for these proﬁles resulted in the DNA database.
Originally, DNA databases included only “those
classes of offenders with a high recidivism rate, such
as sex offenders and violent felons.”3 Recognizing the
crime-solving potential of this technology, state legislatures soon began to expand the scope of DNA database statutes to include broader classes of offenders.
Currently, all ﬁfty states have statutes that mandate
the collection of DNA from individuals convicted of
certain felonies4 and a few states have expanded their
statutes even further by authorizing the taking and
analysis of DNA from certain categories of arrestees.
This article addresses the constitutionality of taking
DNA samples from persons subject to arrest. In particular, this article focuses on the statutes of Virginia
and Louisiana, which have authorized DNA sampling
of persons arrested for speciﬁed offenses, and examines whether these laws are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment’s “special needs” doctrine as outlined by
several Supreme Court rulings.

A. The Origins of DNA Databases
The establishment and expansion of state and federal
DNA databases is predicated on the accuracy of DNA
proﬁling and technology. DNA, or deoxyribonucleic
acid, is the genetic material found in the chromosomes
of most human cells.5 Each DNA molecule consists of
two strands, known as a double helix, that contain a
particular sequence of nucleic acids.6 Although most of
the human genome consists of genetic information that
is shared by a majority of the population, each individual’s chromosomes have minute variations known as
polymorphisms that serve as unique identiﬁers.7 While
some polymorphic genes code for speciﬁc traits such
as eye color, forensic DNA analysis uses noncoding
This article ﬁrst appeared in JLME 33, no. 1.
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regions to identify the differences in a person’s genetic
makeup.8 By isolating those areas of the chromosome
known to be unique to each individual, forensic DNA
testing can compare two samples to determine if the
genetic mutations match, indicating that the samples
contain DNA from the same individual.9 Due to the
polymorphic nature of DNA, “individual differences
make identiﬁcation virtually certain.”10
The most widely used technology for DNA identiﬁcation is the polymerase chain reaction technique
(“PCR”). This technique facilitates DNA identiﬁcation
from even a tiny biological sample such as saliva, blood,
semen, hair, cheek cells and even epithelial skin cells
by making “millions of copies of the small amount of
DNA in the sample.”11 Within the DNA copy produced
by PCR, short tandem repeat (“STR”) technology is
used to identify genetic loci to distinguish DNA proﬁles
“[b]y examining the gene sequence on a speciﬁc location on a chromosome and comparing the length with
the gene sequence on the same chromosome from a
different person.”12 In both state and federal DNA testing laboratories, STR technology is used to identify the
DNA strand at thirteen speciﬁc loci, as designated by
the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.13
The CODIS system “enables federal, state, and local
crime labs to exchange and compare DNA proﬁles electronically, thereby linking crimes to each other and
to convicted offenders.”14 CODIS began in 1990 as a
pilot database for fourteen states,15 and was formalized by the DNA Identiﬁcation Act of 1994.16 The act
empowered the FBI to create an index of DNA proﬁles
from convicted criminals, crime scene evidence, unidentiﬁed human remains and samples “voluntarily
contributed from relatives of missing persons.”17 By
1998, CODIS was connected to all ﬁfty states18 as a
national index linking databases at the local, state and
national levels.19 All proﬁles originate at the local level
in the Local DNA Index System (“LDIS”), which are
then fed into the State DNA Index System (“SDIS”)
and the National DNA Index System (“NDIS”).20 In the
three tiered levels of CODIS, each state maintains its
own SDIS allowing “state and local agencies to operate
their databases according to their speciﬁc legislative or
legal requirements.”21
The three levels of CODIS are made up of two indexes, the Convicted Offender index that “contains
DNA proﬁles of individuals convicted of felony sex offenses (and other violent crimes)” and the Forensic
index containing “DNA proﬁles developed from crime
scene evidence.”22 As of April 2004, the FBI maintained
a total of 1,762,005 DNA proﬁles in the NDIS database.23 These proﬁles “contain a specimen identiﬁer,
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the sponsoring laboratory’s identiﬁer, the initials (or
name) of DNA personnel associated with the analysis,
and the actual DNA characteristics. CODIS does not
store criminal history information, case-related information, social security numbers or dates-of-birth.”24
Using these two indexes, law enforcement ofﬁcials at
the state and local levels are able to search between
crime scene evidence and individual DNA proﬁles from
around the nation.
All ﬁfty states currently have legislation requiring
that DNA proﬁles of certain categories of individuals
be included in at least two levels of CODIS.25 But the
legislation concerning what classes of offenders are to
be incorporated varies widely from state to state.26 The
lack of consistency of state legislation is even more
problematic due to the huge backlog of samples waiting to be analyzed and catalogued in state and local
DNA testing facilities. Congress attempted to combat
this problem by passing the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000.27 This statute authorized the
Attorney General to issue grants to the states for the
purpose of carrying out “for inclusion in the Combined
DNA Index System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, DNA analyses of samples taken from individuals
convicted of a qualifying state offense.”28
In 2004, however, the Attorney General submitted a
report to Congress regarding the DNA evidence backlog
that cited “approximately 542,700 criminal cases with
biological evidence” awaiting testing and analysis.29
The reason for this massive backlog is that state and
local crime laboratories are “overworked, understaffed
and insufﬁciently funded.”30 President Bush has made
additional efforts to reduce this backlog through his
initiative Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology
by proposing “$1 billion in funding over 5 years to reduce the DNA testing backlog, build crime lab capacity,
stimulate research and development, support training,
protect the innocent, and identify missing persons.”31
States legislatures have also realized the potential of
DNA technology to assist in solving crimes and convicting the guilty. Recognizing the importance of expanding DNA databases to accomplish this goal, many
states have increased the number of individuals eligible
for inclusion in these databases. As states broaden the
category of offenders, they will increase their eligibility
for federal funding to reduce their backlogs and solve
more crimes.

B. The Statutes of Virginia and Louisiana
Authorizing the Taking of DNA from
Arrestees
Two of the most aggressive states in DNA database expansion are Virginia and Louisiana. In 2002, Virginia
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enacted a provision allowing the taking and analysis
of a DNA sample for “[e]very person arrested for the
commission or attempted commission of a violent felony” to “determine identiﬁcation characteristics speciﬁc to the person.”32 Those eligible for DNA testing are
individuals arrested for the following offenses: ﬁrst and
second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter,33
mob-related felonies,34 any kidnapping or abduction
felony,35 any malicious felonious assault or malicious
bodily wounding,36 robbery,37 carjacking,38 criminal
sexual assault39 or arson.40 After obtaining the sample
from the arrestee’s person, the sample is analyzed and
the remainder of sample is stored by the Division of
Forensic Sciences41 “in accordance with speciﬁc procedures adopted by regulation of the Division to ensure
the integrity and conﬁdentiality of the samples.”42 The
Commonwealth of Virginia makes the results of the
analysis of DNA samples “available directly to federal,
state and local law-enforcement ofﬁcers upon request
made in furtherance of an ofﬁcial investigation of any
criminal offense.”43 The unauthorized use or dissemination of information from stored DNA samples is a
punishable misdemeanor.44
Virginia’s DNA database, begun in 1989, is the oldest
and largest DNA database in the country.45 As the ﬁrst
state to take DNA from convicted felons and arrestees,
Virginia has led the nation in DNA database expansion.
State Attorney General Jerry W. Kilgore, who proposed
the legislative package for the database expansion to arrestees has stated, “DNA is the ﬁngerprint of today…it’s
a public safety issue.”46 Hinting to the legislative intent
behind the expansion, General Kilgore has stated that
“[i]t’s no secret that an enhanced database increases
the chances of solving crimes,”47 and that “[database
expansion] will help us solve cases much quicker and
ensure public safety by making sure somebody’s not
released back into the general public who has committed a string of crimes.”48 Tim Murtaugh, a spokesman for the Attorney General, has stated that “[w]e see
[DNA database expansion] as an important tool for
law enforcement that helps the victims of crimes and
the families of victims.”49 Moreover, a spokeswoman of
Virginia Delegate Ryan McDougle, who sponsored HB
829 to expand the state’s DNA database to cover arrestees, conﬁrmed that the legislative intent behind the
bill was to match the DNA of violent felony arrestees to
DNA evidence from unsolved crimes and not to merely
obtain the identity of those arrested by the state.50
In 2003, Louisiana enacted legislation expanding its
DNA databases to cover certain categories of arrestees. Louisiana authorizes the taking of DNA samples
from “[a] person who is arrested for a felony or other
speciﬁed offense, including an attempt, conspiracy,
criminal solicitation, or accessory after the fact of such
dna fingerprinting & civil liberties • summer 2006

offenses.”51 These other speciﬁed offenses include: battery,52 unlawful use of a laser on a police ofﬁcer,53 simple
assault,54 assault on a schoolteacher,55 stalking,56 misdemeanor carnal knowledge of a juvenile,57 prostitution,58 soliciting for prostitutes,59 prostitution by massage,60 letting premises for prostitution61 and peeping
tom62 offenses. Louisiana also permits DNA testing of
juveniles who are arrested for similar felony offenses
or attempts.63 Additionally, the legislature provided
for recommendation by the state police for the inclusion of other categories of offenders in the state DNA
database, stating that “the state police shall consider
those offenses for which DNA testing will have a substantial impact on the detection and identiﬁcation of
sex offenders and other violent offenders.”64 Louisiana
further authorizes the exchange of DNA proﬁles contained within the state database pursuant to the guidelines and requestor identiﬁcation veriﬁcation adopted
by the state police.65 Like the state of Virginia, Louisiana prohibits unauthorized disclosure of any identifying DNA information.66
Although the current Louisiana statute authorizing
DNA testing of arrestees was passed in 2003, the history of the legislation dates back to 1997.67 Although
technically one of the ﬁrst states to pass such broad
DNA legislation, due to a lack of funding the database failed to become a reality by its September 1, 1999
implementation date and was repealed by the legislature that year.68 As other states pushed forward with
legislation to expand their DNA databases, Louisiana
was at a standstill for lack of funding. In 2000, one
assistant director at the Louisiana State Police crime
lab commented, “[w]e’re required to do something,
and we have no funding to do it. Therefore, we have
no data bank.”69
It took the tragic acts of serial killer Derrick Todd Lee
to motivate Louisiana to push for legislation to expand
the state’s DNA database to cover certain categories of
arrestees. After interviewing and analyzing DNA from
over 600 men, police ofﬁcials in Louisiana had no deﬁnitive leads in the investigation of the serial killing of
ﬁve women in and around Baton Rouge.70 When a state
ofﬁcial received a tip that Lee was a suspect in a 1992
murder and the 1998 disappearance of two women
from Zachary, Louisiana, police began investigating
Lee’s extensive criminal history, which included peeping into homes, stalking and attempted murder.71 Police
ofﬁcials obtained a warrant to take and analyze Lee’s
DNA, which was matched with trace evidence from
four murder victims attributed to the Baton Rouge
serial killer.72 Lee was subsequently charged with ﬁve
counts of murder, ﬁve counts of aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and second-degree kidnapping.73
Speaking of the Lee case, Ray Wickenheiser, the direc167
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tor of the Acadiana Crime Lab in Louisiana stated,
“[t]here’s no doubt in my mind that with arrestee testing – I can guarantee – four lives would have been
saved. If we had proper arrestee information, [Lee]
would have been arrested after the ﬁrst case.”74
Other evidence indicating the purpose behind Louisiana’s DNA law can be gleaned from statements made
by Louisiana state representative Huntington “Hunt”
Downer, who sponsored the 1997 DNA legislation. “I
really think [DNA] ought to be [taken from] everybody who’s arrested. Had there been DNA sampling
early on in [the Lee] criminal case, maybe we could
have caught [Lee] before he killed.”75 Downer has additionally commented, “DNA is a ﬁngerprint; it’s not
an invasion of privacy. It’s getting guilty people off the
streets and innocent people out of jail.”76 Interestingly,
an amendment by Downer that would have applied the
law to anyone arrested for any offense was removed by
the legislature before the passage of the bill.77

ana has generated a great deal of controversy regarding
the Fourth Amendment rights of arrestees.83 Imagine,
for example, a scenario where law enforcement ofﬁcials
suspect an individual, John Doe, as the perpetrator of
a series of rapes, but lack probable cause or the lesser
standard of reasonable suspicion for the individual’s
arrest or investigatory seizure. Both Virginia and Louisiana give police the authority to take a DNA sample
from Doe if he is arrested for another serious offense.
If Doe, let’s say, is arrested in Louisiana for soliciting
prostitution, the police can obtain a DNA sample in
order to compare it with a sample from the crime scene
evidence of the serial rapist.
Or, imagine a second scenario where a person, Joe
Smith, is arrested in Virginia for robbery. A DNA sample is taken from Smith pursuant to his arrest. Months
later, state officials determine that Smith’s DNA
matches the DNA trace evidence found at the scene
of an unsolved murder. In both hypotheticals, the link

To determine whether a particular governmental intrusion constitutes a search,
the Court asks whether the target of the intrusion has a subjective expectation
of privacy in the information obtained by the government, and whether
“society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.”
Louisiana left no doubt as to the purpose behind
extending the DNA database to arrestees. In fact, the
state enacted a statute explaining that “[t]he Louisiana Legislature ﬁnds and declares that DNA data
banks are important tools in criminal investigations,
in the exclusion of individuals who are the subject of
criminal investigations or prosecutions, and in deterring and detecting recidivist acts.”78 Like most states,
Louisiana suffers a massive backlog of DNA samples
waiting to be analyzed.79 By expanding its database, the
state can expect to increase its federal funding to help
reduce that backlog. State senator Jay Dardenne, who
sponsored the 2003 bill, stated that even if the money
needed to pay for the expansion is not available in the
state budget, the bill was needed to “attract a federal
grant that would pay for the testing of 27,000 inmates
in state prisons and people on probation or parole.”80
Dardenne further stated in a Louisiana senate ﬂoor
debate that the real beneﬁt of expanding the database
to include arrestees was to identify the culprits of crime
and help convict the guilty, especially after the Derrick
Todd Lee case.81
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees all persons the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.82 The expansion of
DNA databases in states such as Virginia and Louisi168

connecting the suspects to the unsolved crimes is the
taking and analysis of a DNA sample from the suspect
upon being arrested.84 This paper addresses whether
this procedure is consistent with Fourth Amendment
principles.

II. Does DNA Samlping Constitute a Search?
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Thus, if DNA sampling is to trigger Fourth Amendment protections, it must be either
a search or seizure. To determine whether a particular
governmental intrusion constitutes a search, the Court
asks whether the target of the intrusion has a subjective
expectation of privacy in the information obtained by
the government, and whether “society is prepared to
accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.”85 In
deciding whether an arrestee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her DNA proﬁle, the Court will
most likely consider three factors: the extent to which
DNA is exposed to the public, the extent of any bodily
intrusion in obtaining the DNA sample, and the nature
of the information extracted from a DNA proﬁle.86

A. Exposure to the Public
Information or property that is exposed to the public
is generally not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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Thus, even forcible police intrusions to obtain information revealed to the public will not be considered a
search. Compelling an individual to provide a voice exemplar, for instance, is not a search because the physical characteristics of a person’s voice are constantly
exposed to the public.87 If one construes this rationale
broadly, DNA could be considered a physical characteristic that is constantly exposed to the public. We all
leave traces of DNA everywhere we go – by losing hair,
leaving saliva on a drinking glass at a restaurant, or
shedding skin cells. This suggests that acquisition of an
arrestee’s DNA would not be considered a search.88
The Court, however, is likely to ﬁnd the taking of
an arrestee’s DNA is a search. First, the lower court
cases that have broadly applied the “public exposure”
rationale have involved only the discovery of limited
information, such as one’s identiﬁcation89 or the presence of chemicals transferred from stolen money.90
By contrast, DNA can potentially reveal a broad array
of personal information.91 Second, in Kyllo v. United
States,92 the Supreme Court ruled that a thermal imaging device directed at a home constituted a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court explained that a search occurs when government
agents use sense-enhancing technology to collect any
information regarding the interior of a home that could
not otherwise be obtained without a physical invasion,
“at least where (as here) the technology in question is
not in general public use.”93 Assuming that Kyllo’s holding is not limited to the home – where Fourth Amendment concerns have typically been the highest – one
can certainly argue that DNA sampling and analysis
is sense-enhancing technology that is not in general
public use.94 Therefore, DNA testing of arrestees would
constitute a search, even if DNA, like heat emanations,
is technically exposed to the public.

B. Extent of Bodily Intrusion
Any physical intrusion into the body, such as using
a needle to withdraw blood, constitutes a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes. In Schmerber v. California,95 a case in which blood was forcibly taken from
an arrestee suspected of drunk driving so that it could
be tested for its alcohol content, the Court held that
“such testing procedures plainly constitute searches
of persons.”96 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n97 extended this principle to include the taking of
breath samples. Skinner involved federal regulations
mandating drug testing of railway workers who violate
safety rules or were involved in train accidents without
individualized suspicion of alcohol or drug use.98 The
Court held that “[s]ubjecting a person to a breathalyzer
test…implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity
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and, like the blood-alcohol test [the Court] considered
in Schmerber, should also be deemed a search.”99
Skinner further held that mandatory urinalysis constitutes a search even though “collecting and testing
urine samples do not entail a surgical intrusion into
the body.”100 Urinalysis was a search because “chemical
analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host
of private medical facts about an employee, including
whether she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”101 The
Court further explained that “the process of collecting
the sample to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination,
itself implicates privacy interests.”102
In determining whether the Court will ﬁnd DNA
sampling to be a search, one might distinguish Skinner
on the grounds that there was a further privacy interest
at stake in that case, to wit, the visual or aural monitoring of the urine sample, that would not be present in
a case of DNA sampling.103 Further, the privacy concerns implicated by DNA testing and analysis may be
diminished by limiting access to the information that
can be obtained from the DNA proﬁle. Despite these
differences, the Court will likely follow the reasoning
of Schmerber, Skinner and its progeny when determining whether DNA sampling and analysis is subject to
constitutional scrutiny.104 Therefore, although DNA
sampling can be accomplished in a minimally invasive
manner by testing epithelial cells, the odds are very
good that the Court will conclude that the taking and
analysis of the sample is a search under the Fourth
Amendment.

C. Nature of the Information Extracted
Finally, the nature of the information obtained by the
government may be signiﬁcant in determining whether
DNA sampling will be deemed a search. An individual’s
DNA contains a wealth of information.105 Likewise, the
noncoding regions used in DNA proﬁling “can indicate
or predict disease states, and all loci, coding and noncoding alike, can be used for parentage testing.”106 Concededly, the DNA proﬁles maintained in the CODIS
database contain purely biometric identiﬁers that are
“represented in the data base…as a series of digits comparable to social security numbers or passport numbers.”107 Privacy concerns, however, are implicated by
the maintenance of DNA samples in a databank, much
like a blood bank. Even scholars like Professor David
Kaye recognize the privacy interests implicated in the
storage of DNA in databanks for an inﬁnite period of
time. “Although health insurers are not particularly
interested in [DNA] information and although a small
explosion of state laws ban or restrict [DNA information] use in insurance and the workplace, the possibility that the government will allow the samples to fall
169
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into the wrong hands or will misuse them for its own
purposes must not be ignored.”108 Because DNA has the
potential to reveal a host of private facts about an arrestee, the Court will probably ﬁnd that forcibly taking
and testing DNA is a search.
In sum, should the Court address the constitutionality of Louisiana or Virginia’s statutes authorizing the
DNA sampling of arrestees, it will most likely ﬁnd that

suspicionless searches or seizures that are justiﬁed by
governmental interests unrelated to law enforcement
concerns.
While the Court has issued several rulings under its
“special needs” analysis, these cases do not form a coherent doctrine. Twelve years ago, Professor William
Stuntz observed that “little or no effort has been made
to explain what these ‘special needs’ are; the term turns
out to be no more than a label
that indicates when a lax standard will apply.”112 Since that
In sum, should the Court address the constitutionality
of Louisiana or Virginia’s statutes authorizing the DNA time, the Court’s special needs
jurisprudence has not become
sampling of arrestees, it will most likely ﬁnd that the
more comprehensible. Even
when a majority of the Court
taking and analyzing of DNA samples is a search.
can agree on a particular result, members of the majority
the taking and analyzing of DNA samples is a search.
will disagree over a critical component of the special
If DNA sampling is measured by the three factors disneeds analysis.113 In other cases, the ad hoc nature of
cussed above, the Court’s precedents plainly suggest
the Court’s reasoning has produced rulings that are not
that this process is a search under the Fourth Amendlogically consistent, which, in turn, has prompted lower
ment.109
court decisions that are contradictory.114 More importantly, and pertinent to the issue of the constitutionIII. Special Needs Analysis and DNA Searches
ality of taking an arrestee’s DNA sample, the Court’s
If DNA sampling and analysis is deemed a search, it
rulings have not done a very good job of identifying the
must be reasonable in order to comply with the Fourth
line between law enforcement and special needs.115
Amendment. In most criminal contexts, a search is
The remainder of this article, which contains two
reasonable if conducted pursuant to a judicial warrant
parts, will canvas the Court’s special needs cases with
or based on individualized probable cause.110 Because
an eye toward identifying the factors that the Court
neither Louisiana nor Virginia’s statutes authorizing
will likely emphasize should it address the constituthe taking of an arrestee’s DNA requires a judicial wartionality of taking a DNA sample from an arrestee.
rant or individualized suspicion, these searches must
In the ﬁrst part, I describe the origins of the special
satisfy a recognized exception to the warrant or probneeds analysis. This part also analyzes the rulings the
able cause requirement in order to survive constituCourt has speciﬁcally labeled special needs cases. At
tional scrutiny. Because the so-called “special needs”
the end of the second part, I will consider two cases,
exception permits suspicionless searches in a variety
New York v. Burger116 and Indianapolis v. Edmond,117
of contexts, it would seem to be the most appropriate
which have, at times, been lumped together with the
category for analyzing the constitutionality of taking
special needs cases.118 Although these two cases share
an arrestee’s DNA.
signiﬁcant characteristics with the special needs cases,
Before deciding whether obtaining an arrestee’s DNA
I believe that, as a doctrinal matter, these cases do
sample without probable cause or judicial authorizanot fall into the special needs category. Nevertheless,
tion constitutes a “special need” search, it is necessary
both cases draw attention to the issue of searches that
to understand the scope and limitations of the Court’s
serve primary and secondary purposes. And both cases
special needs cases. Under the special needs cases, govhighlight the conﬂict between the special needs cases,
ernment ofﬁcials are permitted to conduct searches
which forbid searches that promote criminal law interand seizures without any individualized suspicion of
ests, and the administrative search cases, which permit
criminality, negligence or malfeasance. Although indisearches that simultaneously advance civil and crimividualized suspicion and judicial warrants are genernal law interests. The ﬁnal part of the article discusses
ally required when the government intrudes into the
the constitutionality of the Louisiana and Virginia laws
privacy of citizens, the Court has recognized excepthat authorize the taking of DNA samples from setions to this norm “when ‘special needs, beyond the
lected arrestees.
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable cause requirement impracticable.’”111 The
Court has applied the special needs formula to allow
170
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A. Origins of the Special Needs Analysis

worthy for several reasons. First, as Professor Stephen
Schulhofer has explained, Justice Blackmun’s opinJustice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in New Jersey
119
v. T.L.O. marked the formal start of the special needs
ion was an effort to “rein in” Justice White’s analysis,
analysis. T.L.O. concerned the constitutionality of an
which had proceeded directly to a balancing test, while
assistant vice-principal’s search of a high school stu“bypass[ing] the presumption in favor of probable
dent’s purse upon suspecting the student had violated
cause” that is normally required for searches that suba rule against smoking. The search revealed marijuana
stantially intrude upon a person’s privacy.126 Second,
and evidence of marijuana dealing. The results of the
when Justice Blackmun spoke of “special needs,” he
search were turned over to the police and the state
did not restrict that category to interests unrelated to
subsequently brought juvenile delinquency charges
law enforcement concerns. Before he wrote the lines
against the student. The T.L.O. majority ruled that the
that would become the “standard of review” employed
search was constitutional. Speaking generally, Justice
in subsequent rulings by the Court, Justice Blackmun
White’s majority opinion explained that “the legality
explained that a balancing test was proper only when
of a search of a student should depend simply on the
the Court was confronting “a special law enforcement
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
need for greater ﬂexibility.”127 And he used other law
enforcement examples, such as
frisking suspects for weapons and
To date, the Court has decided eight special needs
roving border patrol stops, to illustrate when a balancing test, rather
cases. All but two of the cases involved suspicionless
than strictly applying the probable
drug testing plans. And the Court has found that all
cause and warrant requirements,
but two of the searches were constitutional.
was appropriate for judging the
legality of a search or seizure.
Finally, Justice Blackmun’s spesearch.”120 Under Justice White’s balancing formula,
cial needs formula was not an updated version of the
probable cause and judicial warrants are not required
administrative search doctrine. Almost twenty years
when school ofﬁcials conduct searches of students beprior to T.L.O., the Court had re-examined and relieved to be violating the criminal law or school rules.
formulated its views on administrative searches. In
Although Justice Blackmun agreed with the result
Camara v. Municipal Court,128 the Court overruled
reached by the majority and “with much that is said in
Frank v. Maryland,129 which had effectively eliminated
121
its opinion,” he cautioned that the majority’s reasonFourth Amendment scrutiny for ﬁre, health and housing had “omit[ted] a critical step in its analysis” when
ing inspections. In holding that health inspections did
determining the legality of a school search. According
implicate signiﬁcant Fourth Amendment interests,
to Justice Blackmun, Justice White’s majority opinCamara explained that administrative searches would
ion was too quick to apply a balancing test. Blackmun
satisfy constitutional concerns if ofﬁcials relied upon
believed that a balancing test was appropriate only
“reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
after the Court had identiﬁed special or compelling
conducting an area inspection” and obtained adminislaw enforcement needs that justify dispensing with the
trative warrants that authorized the searches.130
normal requirements of probable cause and a judicial
In his T.L.O. concurrence, Justice Blackmun did not
warrant.122 “Only in those exception circumstances in
utilize the framework established in Camara and its
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
administrative search progeny. Indeed, Blackmun’s
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
“plea for showing some ‘special needs’ is a far cry from
requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to subthe four elements that justiﬁed departure from the
stitute its balancing of interests for that of the FramFourth Amendment framework in Camara – a neutral
ers.”123 Justice Blackmun believed that a balancing test
plan, a compelling need to search, an absence of workwas proper because “[t]he elementary and secondary
able alternatives to the dilution of probable cause, and
school setting presents a special need for ﬂexibility
a substantially diminished intrusion on privacy.”131 Like
justifying a departure from the balance struck by the
Justice White’s majority opinion, Blackmun’s special
Framers.”124 According to Blackmun, maintaining disneeds model diminished Fourth Amendment safecipline and safety in schools would not be possible if
guards. As Professor Schulhofer has observed, Justice
school ofﬁcials had to show probable cause or await
Blackmun “was willing to embark on de novo balancjudicial authorization before searching a student.125
ing (and ultimately to uphold the search [in T.L.O.]) on
Justice Blackmun’s approach to resolving the Fourth
the more slender basis of ‘special needs’ that render the
Amendment question presented in T.L.O. was noteprobable cause requirement merely ‘impracticable.’”132
dna fingerprinting & civil liberties • summer 2006
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Finally, as the proceedings in T.L.O. illustrated, Justice
Blackmun did not propose limiting access to the results
of a special needs search to those ofﬁcials responsible
for initiating the search. Perhaps because Blackmun
did not contemplate that a special needs search would
be restricted to contexts unrelated to law enforcement
concerns, he raised no objection when the fruits of the
search in T.L.O. were turned over to the police and
subsequently used in a juvenile proceeding brought by
state ofﬁcials.

B. Development of the Special Needs Doctrine
Although Justice Blackmun spoke only for himself in
T.L.O., a majority of the Court soon adopted his special
needs formula as the controlling standard for measuring the constitutionality of suspicionless searches outside of traditional law enforcement contexts. To date,
the Court has decided eight special needs cases. All but
two of the cases involved suspicionless drug testing
plans. And the Court has found that all but two of the
searches were constitutional. When considered as a
whole, however, the Court’s special needs cases do not
provide an overarching theory that clearly identiﬁes
which searches will satisfy the Court’s constitutional
scrutiny.
1) Searches by governmental employers
O’Connor v. Ortega133 was the ﬁrst case where a majority of the Court adopted Justice Blackmun’s special
needs formula to uphold a warrantless, suspicionless
search. Ortega involved a governmental employer’s
search of an employee’s private ofﬁce for work-related
reasons. Following the search, the employee sued the
ofﬁcial in charge of the search and others, alleging that
the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice O’Connor
ruled that a public employer need not have probable
cause or judicial authorization before conducting a
work-related search of an employee’s ofﬁce. She explained that the “efﬁcient and proper operation of
the workplace” justiﬁed proceeding without traditional Fourth Amendment safeguards.134 Thus, Justice
O’Connor concluded that “‘special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement make the…probable
cause requirement impracticable’ for legitimate workrelated, noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct.”135
Justice O’Connor’s ﬁnding that a special need existed
in Ortega turned mostly on the motivations behind the
search. She explained that when governmental supervisors conduct searches for work-related employee misconduct, “they have an interest substantially different
from ‘the normal need for law enforcement.’”136 Public
employers are concerned with the efﬁcient operation
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of their agencies; they are not concerned with enforcing the criminal law.137 She also stated that a probable
cause requirement for searches directed at government
employees would cause “tangible and often irreparable
damage to [an] agency’s work, and ultimately to the
public interest,”138 and that it was unrealistic to expect
government supervisors to familiarize themselves with
the niceties of probable cause, “at least when the search
is not used to gather evidence of a criminal offense.”139
After determining that a special need justiﬁed bypassing the probable cause and warrant requirements,
O’Connor announced that this category of searches of
employees “should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.”140
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun dissented in Ortega
and argued, inter alia, that “there was no ‘special need’
to dispense with the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”141 Recalling his
earlier opinions which were the progenitors of his special needs formula, Blackmun characterized the special
needs formula as approximating the exigent circumstances exception for traditional police searches. He
explained that “only when the practical realities of a
particular situation suggest that a government ofﬁcial
cannot obtain a warrant based upon probable cause
without sacriﬁcing the ultimate goals to which a search
would contribute, does the Court turn to a ‘balancing’
test to formulate a standard of reasonableness for this
context.”142
Keeping in mind this concern, Justice Blackmun argued that the facts in Ortega revealed no special need
because there was no urgency to conduct a warrantless
search of Dr. Ortega’s ofﬁce.
[T]his was an investigatory search undertaken to
obtain evidence of charges of mismanagement at a
time when Dr. Ortega was on administrative leave
and not permitted to enter the Hospital’s grounds.
There was no special practical need that might have
justiﬁed dispensing with the warrant and probable-cause requirements. Without sacriﬁcing their
ultimate goal of maintaining an effective institution devoted to training and healing, to which the
disciplining of Hospital employees contributed,
petitioners could have taken any evidence of Dr.
Ortega’s alleged improprieties to a magistrate in
order to obtain a warrant.143
None of the opinions in Ortega elaborated on the scope
or limitations of the special needs exception. Perhaps
none of the Justices felt compelled to announce criteria
for distinguishing between searches that are “beyond
the normal need for law enforcement” and traditional
police searches because the facts in Ortega undoubtjournal of law, medicine & ethics
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edly involved the former category. Moreover, unlike
in T.L.O., the fruits of the search in Ortega were not
given to the police or used to prosecute the target of
the search. But a second type of special needs intrusion,
searching the homes of probationers, would force the
Court to address the applicability of the special needs
exception to a search that was more characteristic of a
traditional police intrusion.
2) Searches of the homes of probationers
Grifﬁn v. Wisconsin144 was decided in the same Term
as Ortega. But unlike Ortega, Grifﬁn involved a search
that resembled a traditional police search for evidence
of criminal conduct. A probation ofﬁcer received a tip
from a police detective that there might be guns in
the home of Grifﬁn, who was on probation. Two probation ofﬁcers, accompanied by three police ofﬁcers,
conducted a warrantless search of Grifﬁn’s home and
discovered a handgun. After Grifﬁn was convicted of
the felony of possession of a ﬁrearm by a convicted
felon, the Court ruled that the search of his home was
constitutionally reasonable despite the absence of a
warrant or probable cause for the search. The Court
ruled the search was permissible because it was carried
out pursuant to an administrative regulation that required “reasonable grounds” to believe that contraband
was present in a probationer’s home.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Scalia initially observed that a “probationer’s home, like anyone else’s,
is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement
that searches be ‘reasonable.”145 Yet, Scalia also noted
that probationers “do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only…conditional
liberty properly dependent on observance of special
[probation] restrictions.’”146 Justice Scalia explained
that a state’s operation of a probation system “presents a ‘special need’ beyond normal law enforcement
that may justify departures from the usual warrant
and probable-cause requirements.”147 The limitations
placed on a probationer’s liberty helps to assure that
probation serves “as a period of genuine rehabilitation
and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.”148 Achieving these goals requires close supervision of probationers. Thus, supervision of probationers, including warrantless searches
of their homes, is a special need “permitting a degree of
impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.”149
In determining where to draw the line between criminal law enforcement and special needs, the reasoning
and result in Grifﬁn are important for at least three
reasons. First, unlike Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Ortega, Justice Scalia did not discuss or explore
the motives for the speciﬁc search in Grifﬁn. Justice
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Scalia’s special needs analysis appeared to assume that
the purpose for the search was to ensure rehabilitation and community safety. Second, unlike the search
in Ortega, there was signiﬁcant police involvement in
the search of Grifﬁn’s home. This fact, however, had
no impact on the Court’s conclusion that the search
was unrelated to traditional law enforcement interests.
Finally, after ﬁnding that a special need justiﬁed the
search, Grifﬁn placed no limitation on who would have
access to the fruits of the search. The handgun discovered by the search was used to prosecute Grifﬁn for an
independent criminal offense, and not used merely to
revoke his probation. Thus, the result and reasoning of
Grifﬁn suggested that the boundaries of a permissible
special needs search would not be narrowly drawn by
the Court.150
3) Drug testing
The third category of special need searches considered
by the Court is urinalysis drug testing. Since 1989, the
Court has decided six urinalysis drug testing cases, and
has upheld four of the drug testing policies. Two of
the cases involved federal policies; both of these plans
were upheld by the Court. Two other policies targeting public school students were also validated by the
Court. The remaining two policies involved drug testing of candidates for state-wide political ofﬁces, and
a public hospital’s plan, devised in close cooperation
with law enforcement ofﬁcials, to test pregnant women
suspected of drug use. The Court found both of these
policies unconstitutional. The results in these cases do
not establish any general legal norm, other than the
conclusion that the special needs exception “has precisely the effect of leaving the law-abiding citizen more
vulnerable to invasions of privacy than the criminal
suspect is.”151 The following discussion will concentrate
on aspects of these cases that are likely to affect the
Court’s thinking on whether taking an arrestee’s DNA
sample constitutes a special need unrelated to law enforcement.
a) Skinner and Von Raab
The Court’s ﬁrst encounter with urinalysis drug testing came in two companion cases, Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives’ Assoc.,152 and National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab,153 both written by Justice Kennedy. Skinner held that federal regulations
requiring the administration of blood, breath and urine
tests to railroad employees who violate safety rules,
or were involved in railroad accidents, did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. The challenged searches did
not require judicial authorization, nor individualized
suspicion that a worker had used narcotics or alcohol.
Likewise, Von Raab upheld Custom Service regulations
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mandating a urinalysis test from employees who seek
transfer or promotion to positions directly involving
drug interdiction or requiring the employee to carry a
ﬁrearm. As in Skinner, the Custom Service’s drug testing policy did not require any individualized suspicion
that an employee had used drugs.
Skinner explained that the government’s interest in
regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure
safety presents a special need beyond law enforcement
that justiﬁed a departure from the traditional safeguards of judicial warrants and probable cause. The
regulations targeted employees engaged in “safety-sensitive tasks.”154 Justice Kennedy noted that the government’s interest to ensure the safety of the traveling
public as well as the employees themselves justiﬁed
restricting employees’ use of controlled substances.
Requiring probable cause before conducting a search
of a covered employee is inconsistent with the government’s need to supervise employees. “Railroad supervisors, like school ofﬁcials, and hospital administrators,
are not in the business of investigating violations of the
criminal laws or enforcing administrative codes, and
otherwise have little occasion to become familiar with
the intricacies of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”155 Finally, Justice Kennedy noted that the
testing procedures mandated by the federal government were not designed “to assist in the prosecution of
employees but rather ‘to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from impairment
by alcohol or drugs.’”156
Unlike Ortega and Grifﬁn, Skinner did address, albeit obliquely, the crucial question of who would have
access to any evidence revealed by a special needs
search. In a footnote, Justice Kennedy observed that
although the challenged regulation “might be read
broadly to authorize the release of biological samples
to law enforcement authorities, the record does not
disclose that it was intended to be, or actually has been,
so used.”157 He dismissed the challengers’ concern that
the testing process was a pretext to enable the gathering of evidence for prosecutorial purposes. “Absent a
persuasive showing that the [federal] testing program
is pretextual, we assess the [federal] scheme in light of
its obvious administrative purpose.”158 Finally, Kennedy
left open whether “routine use in criminal prosecutions of evidence obtained pursuant to the administrative scheme would give rise to an inference of pretext,
or otherwise impugn the administrative nature of the
[federal] program.”159
Skinner’s discussion of the “access” issue seems almost purposefully vague. After directly stating that
testing for controlled substances was “not to assist in
the prosecution of employees but rather ‘to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations,’” Justice
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Kennedy seemed to retreat from this statement because the challenged regulations did provide for thirdparty litigants to have access to test results.160 Thus, as
Justice Marshall’s dissent pointed out, the “regulations
not only do not forbid, but, in fact, appear to invite
criminal prosecutors to obtain the blood and urine
samples drawn by the [federal ofﬁcials] and use them
as basis of criminal investigations and trials.”161 Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s refusal to withhold approval of
the policy unless law enforcement ofﬁcials were denied
access to test results “casts considerable doubt on the
conceptual basis of [Skinner] – that the ‘special need’
of railway safety is one ‘beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.’”162
Of course, one could argue that once the Court
approved mandatory testing, the intrusion upon an
employee’s privacy is the same regardless of whether
test results are made available to third-party litigants.
Therefore, as Professor Schulhofer has noted, “[i]t
would be perverse to hold that innocent employees
can be subjected to these indignities while drug abusers caught by the test are shielded from prosecution.”163
But the fact that an employee’s privacy interest is invaded by testing ab initio does not address the separate, and critical, question of whether a search that
serves criminal and civil law purposes is consistent
with the special needs formula.164 The most that can
be said about Skinner is that the Court was unwilling
to address whether “routine use in criminal prosecutions” of test results would prevent application of the
special needs exception. Although the Court could have
sent a clear message on the scope of the special needs
exception by approving the challenged regulations on
the condition that test results be unavailable to law enforcement ofﬁcials, apparently, a majority of the Court
was not ready to take that step.
Justice Kennedy’s special needs analysis in Skinner
seemed to raise more questions than provide answers
about where the Court was willing to draw the line between special needs and law enforcement. By contrast,
his opinion in Von Raab was more straightforward
on where the line between special needs and law enforcement was drawn. A mandatory urinalysis test for
Custom Service employees who seek transfer or promotion to certain sensitive positions was a special need
unrelated to law enforcement interests for two reasons:
First, “[t]est results may not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee’s consent.”165 Second, the purpose of the policy was to deter
illegal drug use among employees who might occupy
sensitive positions in the Customs Service.
When the fruits of a search are unavailable to law
enforcement ofﬁcials, the civil function of the search
is evident.166 In contrast to the search in Grifﬁn, the
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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searches in Von Raab would not be initiated by law
enforcement ofﬁcials,167 did not involve signiﬁcant police participation, nor would the results be given to
prosecutorial ofﬁcials. When the procedures leading
up to and the fruits of a search are separated from the
tentacles of law enforcement, a stronger case for the
special needs exception is demonstrated.
At the same time, the second reason cited in Von
Raab – the Custom Service’s interest in deterring drug
use among its employees – also sends an important
(and different) message about the scope of the special
needs exception. Deterring drug use among a select
group of governmental employees, particularly where
there has been no demonstrated history of drug use
among such employees,168 is a broad goal. Like the governmental interest in “ﬁghting crime,” the aim of deterring drug use has an almost limitless reach and scope.
If such a boundless governmental interest constitutes
a special need that justiﬁes intrusive searches without
probable cause, then the special needs formula will
validate many types of governmental intrusions so long
as the government can identify rational, legitimate reasons for the search.
b) Urinalysis of public school students
The second set of urinalysis drug testing cases involved
public school students. In Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton169 and Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92
of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,170 the Court upheld
policies that permitted mandatory and random urinalysis drug tests of students who participate in athletic and competitive extracurricular activities, respectively. In each case, the Court quickly and easily found
that school ofﬁcials had a special need to conduct drug
testing. Repeating the reasoning outlined in T.L.O.,
Acton explained that the warrant and probable cause
requirements would undermine school ofﬁcials’ ability
to maintain discipline and order in the schools.171 More
recently, Earls observed that Fourth Amendment protection differs in the school context because ofﬁcials have
“custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”172
More importantly, the Court also emphasized that
test results were not released to any law enforcement
ofﬁcials. Although this point was not included in the
part of the opinions explaining why special needs exist
in the school context, as in other special needs cases,
this factor helps to deﬁne whether a challenged search
serves civil or criminal law purposes. For example,
while considering the character of the intrusion caused
by the urinalysis, Acton noted that “the results of tests
are disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel
who have a need to know; and they are not turned over
to law enforcement authorities or used for any internal
disciplinary function.”173 Similarly, Earls commented
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that test results are not given to law enforcement ofﬁcials, and the results do not “lead to the imposition of
discipline or have any academic consequences.”174
c) Chandler and Ferguson: Restricting the special
needs exception?
The ﬁnal two urinalysis cases do not fall into any of
the categories described above. More importantly, in
contrast to the cases already discussed, the Court invalidated the challenged drug testing policies because
the searches did not satisfy the special needs formula.
In Chandler v. Miller,175 the Court struck down a Georgia law that required candidates for certain state ofﬁces
to certify that they had taken a urinalysis drug test and
that the test result was negative. Speaking for eight
members of the Court, Justice Ginsburg held that this
law “does not ﬁt within the closely guarded category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”176
In the second case, Ferguson v. City of Charleston,177
the Court invalidated a public hospital’s policy that
conducted urine tests of pregnant patients suspected
of using drugs and turned the results over to law enforcement ofﬁcials. Because the primary purpose of
the hospital’s policy “was to use the threat of arrest and
prosecution in order to force women into treatment,
and given the extensive involvement of law enforcement ofﬁcials at every stage of the policy,”178 Ferguson
concluded that “this case simply does not ﬁt within
the closely guarded category of ‘special needs.’”179 The
reasoning in both Chandler and Ferguson is very likely
to affect the Court’s thinking on whether taking and
analyzing an arrestee’s DNA sample is a valid special
needs search.
In Chandler, Justice Ginsburg’s framing of the issue
was noteworthy. The question before the Court was not
simply whether Georgia’s law served an interest unrelated to law enforcement – which it surely did. Rather,
the “core” issue before the Court was whether “the certiﬁcation requirement warranted a special need.”180
In determining that issue, Justice Ginsburg explained
that “the proffered special need for drug testing must
be substantial – important enough to override the individual’s acknowledged privacy interest, sufﬁciently
vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.”181
Georgia defended its law and the searches that
it required as necessary to promote the integrity of
public ofﬁcials and to deter drug users from attaining state-wide political ofﬁces. Without questioning
the validity of these goals, Justice Ginsburg explained
that the state had failed to identify a “concrete danger
demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment’s
main rule.”182 In other words, there was no evidence
that high-ranking state ofﬁcials were abusing illegal
175

SYMPOSIUM

drugs. Proof of drug abuse among those targeted for
Next, whatever one thinks about the doctrinal founsearches “may help to clarify – and to substantiate – the
dation of Ferguson’s distinction between a search’s
precise hazards posed by such use.”183 Justice Ginsburg
“ultimate goal” and its “immediate objective,”192 it is
also observed that the statute was not “well designed
very clear why the searches in Ferguson were unconto identify candidates who violate antidrug laws.”184
stitutional. The purpose served by the searches “is ulUltimately, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the state
timately indistinguishable from the general interest in
interest (or need) “is symbolic, not ‘special,’ as that term
crime control.”193 Putting aside the search in Grifﬁn,
185
draws meaning from our case law.”
none of the prior special needs searches involved the
In Ferguson, the design and operation of the drug
“collection of evidence for criminal law purposes” with
testing policy was unlike any other policy addressed
an “extensive entanglement of law enforcement” perby the Court. Justice Stevens explained that the insonnel.194 When confronted with the argument that
trusion posed by the searches was considerably more
Grifﬁn demonstrated that the special needs exception
substantial than in previous cases. In the earlier drug
“was developed, and is ordinarily employed, precisely
testing cases “there was no misunderstanding about
to enable searches by law enforcement ofﬁcials who, of
the purpose of the test or the potential use of the test
course, ordinarily have a law enforcement objective,”
results, and there were protections against the dissemithe Ferguson Court replied that the impact of Grifﬁn’s
nation of the results to third parties.”186 In contrast, the
logic was conﬁned to cases involving search targets
searches in Ferguson were intentionally designed to
possessing a diminished expectation of privacy.195
obtain incriminating evidence that would
be turned over to police and prosecutorial
ofﬁcials.
It is very clear why the searches in Ferguson
More importantly, the interest served by
were unconstitutional. The purpose served by
the searches in Ferguson was directly rethe searches “is ultimately indistinguishable
lated to law enforcement. In previous cases,
“the ‘special need’ that was advanced as a
from the general interest in crime control.”
justiﬁcation for the absence of a warrant or
individualized suspicion was one divorced
from the State’s interest in law enforcement.”187 In FerFinally, Ferguson sent a somewhat mixed-message on
guson, however, “the central and indispensable feahow the Court would react to a “multi-purpose” special
ture of the policy from its inception was the use of
needs search. On the one hand, Ferguson reveals that
law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance
government ofﬁcials will not be able to use the special
abuse treatment.”188 Justice Stevens noted that “[w]hile
needs exception as a loophole to implement suspicionthe ultimate goal of the policy may well have been to
less searches for law enforcement purposes. And it will
get [patients] into substance abuse treatment and off
not matter in future cases if state ofﬁcials can articuof drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was
late a broad, civil law objective that is simultaneously
to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in
advanced by the search. “Because law enforcement inorder to reach that goal.”189
volvement always serves some broader social purpose
A few aspects of Chandler and Ferguson should be
or objective,” Ferguson explained, “virtually any nonhighlighted. First, Chandler appears to have “raised the
consensual suspicionless search could be immunized
bar” on the threshold requirement for a special needs
under the special needs doctrine by deﬁning the search
search. It is clear from Justice Ginsburg’s opinion that
solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate,
a proper state interest unrelated to law enforcement
purpose.”196 That approach will not work.
is not enough to trigger the special needs formula. AlOn the other hand, because the result in Ferguson
though reasonable minds might differ over the weightturned on the Court’s conclusion that the primary
iness of Georgia’s interest in “set[ting] a good example”
and immediate goal of the searches was to generate
that its politicians did not use drugs,190 there is no disevidence for law enforcement purposes, the Court left
pute that this interest is a legitimate goal, and one that
open the possibility that a search that is primarily mois unrelated to law enforcement.191 In future cases, the
tivated for civil or administrative purposes, but also
state may have to show that its “special need” is parserves criminal law purposes, might slip through the
ticularly important and outweighs the privacy interests
special needs loophole. That possibility was made more
of individuals who are targeted for searches in order to
probable by Ferguson’s distinguishing of New York v.
trigger the balancing test that follows a ﬁnding that a
Burger.197 Ironically, the search upheld in Burger was
special need exists.
more characteristic of a police search than the searches
invalidated in Ferguson.
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Burger involved a warrantless, suspicionless search
labeled a special needs case, the result and reasoning of
of an automobile junkyard by police ofﬁcers pursuBurger provide a precedent for state ofﬁcials who may
ant to an administrative statute. “Although the statute
claim that obtaining DNA samples of arrestees serves
helped assure that [vehicle] dismantlers are legitimate
both “administrative,” as well criminal law, functions.
business persons and helped trace stolen vehicle parts,
Thus, the conﬂict between the holdings in Burger and
[searches] were carried out solely by police and their
Ferguson is likely to trouble the Court should it decide
main focus was on catching the receiver of stolen propwhether obtaining the DNA samples of arrestees is
erty.”198 The fruits of the search were used to prosecute
constitutional.
Burger for felony and misdemeanor offenses.
Burger’s ruling that an administrative search can
The Burger Court ruled that the search was constiserve the same ultimate purpose of the criminal law,
tutional under its administrative search precedents. In
and that the fruits of that search can be used to prosreaching this result, the Burger Court also concluded
ecute the target of the administrative search, takes
that an otherwise proper administrative search is not
on greater signiﬁcance due to a footnote contained
illegal “because the ultimate purpose of the regulain Indianapolis v. Edmond.207 In Edmond, the Court
tory statute pursuant to which the search is done – the
considered the validity of highway roadblocks “whose
deterrence of criminal behavior – is the same as that
primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of
of penal laws, with the result that the [search] may
illegal narcotics.”208 The Court held that roadblocks
disclose violations not only of the regulatory statute but
violate the Fourth Amendment when their primary
also of the penal statutes.”199 On this latter point, Burger
purpose is to discover evidence of ordinary criminal
concluded that the “discovery of evidence of crimes in
conduct. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor exthe course of an otherwise proper
administrative [search] does
The tension between Ferguson and Burger is obvious:
not render that search illegal or
the administrative scheme susAs Professors Stephen Saltzburg and Dan Capra
pect.”200
have noted, “Burger seems to hold that criminal
Ferguson distinguished Burger
law objectives can be pursued through civil-based
on two grounds. First, Justice
Stevens explained that Burger
means under the ‘special needs’ doctrine,” whereas
involved “an industry in which
“Ferguson seems to hold that civil law objectives
the expectation of privacy in
cannot be pursued through criminal-based means
commercial premises was ‘particularly attenuated’ given the
under the ‘special needs’ doctrine.”
extent to which the industry in
question was closely regulated industry.”201 Second, and “[m]ore important” for special
plained that previously approved checkpoints were deneeds analysis, Burger relied on the “plain adminissigned to serve governmental purposes closely related
trative purposes” of the statutory framework to reject
to the problems of policing the international border or
the claim that the challenged search was a pretext to
the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. By contrast,
obtain evidence for law enforcement purposes.202 Thus,
the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint,
according to Justice Stevens, the fruits of the search
as conceded by the City, was to uncover evidence of
in Burger were “merely incidental to the purposes of
ordinary criminal behavior.209
203
the administrative search.” By contrast, the searches
When confronted with the argument that her reain Ferguson were “speciﬁcally designed to gather evisoning made the constitutional validity of the roaddence of violations of penal laws.”204
block turn on police motivations, which are ordinarThe tension between Ferguson and Burger is obviily irrelevant to Fourth Amendment cases, Justice
ous: As Professors Stephen Saltzburg and Dan Capra
O’Connor did not deny the charge. She stated that “prohave noted, “Burger seems to hold that criminal law
grammatic purposes may be relevant to the validity of
objectives can be pursued through civil-based means
[police] intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general
under the ‘special needs’ doctrine,” whereas “Ferguson
scheme without individualized suspicion.”210 Justice
seems to hold that civil law objectives cannot be purO’Connor explained, however, that an unconstitutional
sued through criminal-based means under the ‘special
roadblock could not be transformed into a permissible
needs’ doctrine.”205 Perhaps the tension is diminished
roadblock by the convenient claim that the checkpoint
because the Ferguson Court did not view Burger as a
served the secondary purpose of keeping drunk drivspecial needs case.206 But even if Burger is not formally
ers off the roads or verifying licenses and registrations
dna fingerprinting & civil liberties • summer 2006
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of motorists. If that argument were valid, police could
“establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long
as they also included a license or sobriety check.”211
Justice O’Connor then dropped an intriguing footnote
where she explained that the Court was not addressing whether police may establish a roadblock with the
“primary purpose of checking licenses or driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of interdicting drugs.”212
The hypothetical roadblock envisioned in Edmond’s
footnote mirrors the search upheld in Burger. Both
intrusions have the primary purpose of promoting
administrative or “Fourth Amendment-legitimate”
governmental interests, and a secondary purpose or
incidental beneﬁt of detecting criminal evidence. The
fact that the multi-purpose roadblock may reveal or
uncover criminal evidence does not undermine its
constitutional validity. An “administrative [or “Fourth
Amendment-legitimate”] scheme is [not] unconstitutional simply because, in the course of enforcing it, [a
police] ofﬁcer may discover evidence of crimes, besides
violations of the scheme itself.”213 Under the rule of
Burger, “[t]he discovery of evidence of crimes in the
course of an otherwise proper administrative [search
or seizure] does not render that search illegal or the
administrative scheme suspect.”214
In his analysis of Edmond, Professor Wayne LaFave
has cautioned that “an illegal multi-purpose checkpoint cannot be made legal by the simple device of assigning ‘the primary purpose’ to one objective instead
of the other, especially since that change is unlikely to
be reﬂected in any signiﬁcant change in the magnitude
of the intrusion suffered by the checkpoint detainee.”215
But the reasoning and result in Burger and the Edmond
footnote may encourage state ofﬁcials to do just that,
i.e., characterizing suspicionless searches as having an
administrative primary purpose, with the discovery of
criminal evidence as being “merely incidental to the
purposes of the administrative search.”216 In any event,
the Court’s special needs precedents provide little guidance on how the Court will react to a suspicionless
search that state ofﬁcials claim serve multiple purposes,
or has a permissible primary purpose, but a secondary
purpose related to criminal law enforcement.217

IV. Is Taking DNA From Arrestees a Valid
Special Needs Search?
Considered as a whole, the Court’s special needs cases
do not neatly ﬁt together as a coherent doctrine. As
already noted, there are inconsistencies within the category of special needs cases, and conﬂicts exist between
the special needs cases and other Fourth Amendment
precedents decided by the Court. Nevertheless, some
fundamental criteria can be derived from the special
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needs cases to determine whether taking DNA samples
from arrestees is constitutional. The criteria include:
the purpose of the search; whether law enforcement
ofﬁcials will have access to the results of the search; the
extent of police involvement in conducting the search;
and ﬁnally, whether the search can be characterized as
serving civil and criminal law interests. Keeping these
criteria in mind, this section discusses the constitutionality of the Louisiana and Virginia laws that authorize
the taking of DNA samples from certain arrestees.

A. Purpose for the Search
From the inception of the special needs exception, the
purpose for a search has been the most important factor in deciding whether the search serves a legitimate
special need unrelated to law enforcement, or instead
“is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.”218 The Louisiana and Virginia
statutes are plainly designed to serve law enforcements
interests. In the case of Louisiana, the state legislature has made its purpose crystal clear: “The Louisiana
Legislature ﬁnds and declares that DNA data banks
are important tools in criminal investigations, in the
exclusion of individuals who are the subject of criminal
investigations or prosecutions, and in deterring and
detecting recidivist acts.”219 The Louisiana legislature
has also stated that “it is the policy of [Louisiana] to assist federal, state, and local criminal justice and law enforcement agencies in the identiﬁcation and detection
of individuals in criminal investigations.”220 Therefore,
to implement this declared policy, the Louisiana legislature has decided that the “best interest” of the state
is served by establishing “a DNA data base and a DNA
data bank containing DNA samples submitted by individuals arrested, convicted, or presently incarcerated
for felony sex offenses and other speciﬁed offenses.”221
If this statement of the purpose behind Louisiana’s
law is not sufﬁcient, other evidence that the state intends to use DNA samples from arrestees for criminal
law purposes can be gleaned from the statements of
state legislators who sponsored the law. State Senator
Dardenne, the sponsor of the 2003 bill that renewed
police authority to obtain samples, explained that the
beneﬁt of expanding the state’s database to include
arrestees was to identify perpetrators of criminal acts
and to assist prosecutors in obtaining convictions of
guilty persons.222
Similarly, Virginia’s statute equally serves the Commonwealth’s interest in assisting and solving criminal investigations. Virginia Attorney General Jerry W.
Kilgore, the main proponent behind expanding the
state’s database to include the DNA of arrestees, compared DNA samples to ﬁngerprints and said that ob-
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taining samples is a “public safety issue.”223 Further,
General Kilgore remarked that “an enhanced database
increases the chances of solving crimes,”224 and that including arrestees’ samples into the database “will help
[the state] solve cases much quicker and ensure public
safety by making sure somebody’s not released back
into the general public who has committed a string
of crimes.”225 More importantly, a spokeswoman for
Virginia Delegate Ryan McDougle, who sponsored the
bill, conﬁrmed that the legislators’ primary intent was
to help law enforcement through the testing, analysis
and comparison of arrestee’s DNA to that of evidence
from unsolved crimes.226
Because the purpose behind the Louisiana and Virginia laws is to use DNA samples from arrestees to
assist law enforcement ofﬁcials “in criminal investigations”227 and to enhance the states’ “chances of solving
crimes,”228 such searches would not ﬁt within the special needs exception. As far back as Ortega, the Court
has approved suspicionless searches provided that the
“search[es] [were] not used to gather evidence of a
criminal offense.”229 Since then, the Court has been adamant that the special needs exception is not to be used
to implement searches for law enforcement purposes.
Most recently, in Ferguson, the Court invalidated a
drug testing plan because “the purpose actually served
by the [hospital’s] searches ‘is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.’”230
To be sure, at this point in the development of the
Court’s special needs doctrine, no one factor has been
controlling or outcome determinative in the Court’s
analysis. But the result in Ferguson strongly suggests
that the “purpose” factor is a “ﬁrst among equals” in the
calculus. If this interpretation is correct, the searches
authorized by the Louisiana and Virginia law are unlikely to be upheld under the special needs analysis.231

B. Law Enforcement Access to DNA Searches
Another important factor for determining whether a
suspicionless search will be upheld under the special
needs rule is whether the results of the search are available to law enforcement ofﬁcials. In the Court’s early
special needs cases, this was not a relevant concern.
In his T.L.O. concurrence, Justice Blackmun raised
no objection to the fact that the results of the school
search in that case were turned over to police ofﬁcials
and later used to bring juvenile delinquency hearings
against the student. Likewise, no member of the Grifﬁn
Court objected when the results of the probation search
were used to prosecute the probationer for an independent offense. Finally, in Skinner, Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion was equivocal on this issue. On the
one hand, Skinner noted that the plaintiffs had not
seriously contended that the drug testing plan for raildna fingerprinting & civil liberties • summer 2006

road workers “was designed as ‘a pretext to enable law
enforcement authorities to gather evidence of penal
law violations.’”232 On the other hand, there was no
denying the fact that the administrative regulations in
Skinner authorized prosecutors to obtain the results
of the searches. Notwithstanding this “invitation” to
prosecutors,233 Skinner upheld the searches and offered the mild caution that it was reserving “for another
day” whether routine use, in criminal prosecutions, of
search results would raise an inference that state ofﬁcials were employing their special needs authority as a
pretext to obtain evidence of criminal offenses.234
Since Skinner, the Court has been more adamant
on the “access” issue, albeit most of the Court’s comments have come in dicta. In approving the drug testing plans in Von Raab, Acton, and Earls, the Court
emphasized that test results would not be turned over
to law enforcement ofﬁcials. The statements in Von
Raab, Acton, and Earls on the “access” issue were dicta,
and were not especially important to the outcome in
the latter two cases. In Ferguson, however, the “access”
issue was directly addressed. The searches in Ferguson
were substantively different from other special needs
searches because the results were disclosed to law enforcement ofﬁcials without the knowledge or consent
of the patients.235 This fact was extremely important.
“The fact that positive test results were turned over to
the police does not merely provide a basis for distinguishing” prior cases,236 Justice Stevens emphasized
that it “also provides an afﬁrmative reason for enforcing the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”237
When one considers this legal backdrop and the fact
that both Louisiana and Virginia make the test results
of DNA samples “available directly to federal, state and
local law-enforcement ofﬁcers upon request made in
furtherance of an ofﬁcial investigation of any criminal
offense,”238 the Court will have to perform some creative
legal analysis to conclude that taking DNA samples
from arrestees constitutes a valid special needs search.
Indeed, common sense suggests that the primary reason for expanding state databases to include the DNA
of arrestees is to help investigate and solve crimes. It
would make no sense to obtain the DNA of arrestees
if the analysis of samples were unavailable to police
ofﬁcials and prosecutors.239 “The legislative interest in
DNA data bases has not been primarily to supplement
or supplant ﬁngerprints as markers of true identity; it
has always been to generate investigative leads.”240

C. Involvement of Police in
Conducting a Search
Another factor the Court is likely to weigh in its special needs calculus is the involvement of the police
in conducting the search. In Grifﬁn, an early special
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needs precedent, there was substantial police involvement in the initiation and execution of the search, but
that fact had no impact on the result.241 By contrast, in
Ferguson, law enforcement and prosecutorial ofﬁcials
were involved in designing, implementing and achieving successful results in the search policy.242 As Justice
Stevens’ majority opinion put it, when there is “extensive entanglement of law enforcement” with a search
policy, that policy “cannot be justiﬁed by reference to
legitimate needs.”243
It is obvious that there has been signiﬁcant law enforcement involvement in the design of Louisiana and
Virginia’s statutes, and there will be substantial law enforcement participation in the implementation of the
searches that these statutes authorize. In both states,
law enforcement needs and the large number of unsolved crimes were essential factors in the push to formulate laws permitting DNA sampling and analysis of
certain categories of arrestees. Louisiana’s law includes
a provision where the state police “may recommend to
the legislature that it enact legislation for the inclusion
of additional offenses for which DNA samples shall be
taken.”244
More importantly, police ofﬁcers will be intimately
involved in executing the searches. Because an arrest,
which is the consummate police act, triggers the state’s
authority to obtain DNA, police involvement is inherent in the acquisition of the DNA samples. Justice Kennedy’s concerns about law enforcement involvement
with the searches that were invalidated in Ferguson
are just as relevant to the police involvement that will
surround the taking of DNA from arrestees. “None of
our special needs precedents has sanctioned the routine inclusion of law enforcement, both in the design
of the policy and in using arrests, either threatened or
real, to implement the system designed for the special
needs objectives.”245 Thus, if Ferguson’s, rather than
Grifﬁn’s, analysis is controlling, the fact that police ofﬁcials are intimately involved in the implementation of
DNA searches strongly suggests that such searches do
not satisfy the special needs exception.

D. DNA Sampling as a “Multi-Purpose”
Search
The searches in Ferguson did not satisfy the special
needs formula because the Court determined that the
primary and immediate purpose of the search was to
obtain evidence for criminal law enforcement purposes.
Ferguson, however, did not address whether the special
needs exception would permit a search that is primarily
motivated for civil or administrative purposes, but also
has a secondary (or simultaneous) function or purpose of discovering evidence of criminal conduct. As
noted above, Burger ruled that a valid administrative
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search will not be declared unconstitutional simply
because the search may disclose violations of both civil
and criminal statutes.246 Although there is signiﬁcant
tension between Ferguson and Burger, for now at least,
the Court has reconciled these cases by explaining that
where the discovery of criminal evidence is “merely incidental to the purposes of the administrative search,”247
the administrative search will not be unconstitutional
on its face.
Because the searches authorized by the Louisiana
and Virginia statutes undoubtedly advance criminal
investigative purposes, there should be no reason for
the Court to consider the constitutionality of a “multipurpose” special needs search. Ferguson is controlling
and the searches authorized by the statutes should be
declared unreasonable. That said, a majority the Court
might be willing to broadly construe these statutes in a
manner that permits the Court to assign other purposes
to the laws. This type of “interpretative surgery” was
performed in Burger. In Burger, the New York Court of
Appeals concluded that a portion of the state’s vehicle
code, which authorized warrantless, suspicionless administrative searches of junkyard dealers, was facially
unconstitutional.248 Although the searches were part
of an administrative scheme directed at “closely regulated” entities, the state court ruled that the statute was
unconstitutional because it “authorize[d] searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and
not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme.”249
In support of this conclusion, the Court of Appeals
noted that the State had “concede[d] in [its] brief
that ‘[t]he immediate purpose of inspecting a vehicle
dismantler’s junkyard is to determine whether the dismantler’s inventory includes stolen property.’”250
As discussed above, the Supreme Court reversed,
and held that New York’s law was a valid administrative search. In overturning the lower court’s ruling, the
Burger Court explained that the New York Court of Appeals had “failed to recognize that a State can address a
major social problem both by way of an administrative
scheme and through penal sanctions.”251 It also noted
that an administrative search can serve the “immediate
goals” of an administrative scheme, while also contributing to achieve “the same ultimate purposes that the
penal laws were intended to achieve.”252 In sum, an
administrative framework that authorizes warrantless
searches “may have the same ultimate purpose as penal
laws, even if its regulatory goals are narrower.”253
Although Burger was an administrative search case, a
majority of the current Court may be persuaded to borrow the interpretative blueprint employed in Burger
to uphold Louisiana and Virginia’s laws as permissible
special needs searches. For example, the states might
argue that obtaining and testing DNA samples of arjournal of law, medicine & ethics
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restees serves the civil or administrative function of
providing a genuine or “true” identity of arrestees. In
the convicted offender DNA cases, a few lower courts
have ruled that the state’s interest in identifying the
persons it arrests, prosecutes and convicts overrides
the diminished privacy interests of individuals in state
custody.254 The argument would continue that just
as police ofﬁcials are permitted to automatically take
“mug shots” and ﬁngerprints from arrestees for identiﬁcation purposes, they should be free to take DNA
samples from arrestees without any requirement of
individualized suspicion.
Some writers and scholars have recognized that the
expansion of DNA testing to arrestees will serve the vital
administrative purpose of discerning the true identities
of individuals subject to arrest. Thus, Virginia or Louisiana might contend that taking DNA samples from arrestees is, as Professor Kaye has observed, “a kind of inventory search, providing an unequivocal record of just
who has been arrested, that is considered appropriate
when the state takes an individual into custody.”255 But
in another, subsequent article, Professor Kaye states
that, in light of Edmond and Ferguson, it is “extremely
implausible”256 that DNA sampling of arrestees could
be justiﬁed under the theory that the primary purpose
of the search is to ascertain an arrestee’s true identity.
In that second article, Professor Kaye rightly notes that
“[t]he legislative interest in DNA data bases has not
been primarily to supplement or supplant ﬁngerprints
as markers of true identity; it has always been to generate investigative leads.”257 It is duplicitous to insist
that the forcible collection of a blood or saliva sample
from an arrestee is for “identiﬁcation” purposes. As
Judge Reinhardt has noted with respect to the mandatory collection of blood samples from federal offenders,
“[t]he collection of a DNA sample…does not ‘identify’
a conditional releasee any more than a search of his
home does – it merely collects more and more information about that releasee that can be used to investigate
unsolved past or future crimes.”258
In sum, even if the Court is willing to perform “interpretative surgery” on the Virginia or Louisiana statutes
when determining the purpose of these laws, it will be
difﬁcult to conclude that the laws advance a primary
purpose that is unrelated to ordinary law enforcement
interests. Both of these laws promote interests that are
“ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest
in crime control.”259 While the searches authorized by
these statutes certainly may advance the states’ secondary or ultimate interest in determining the identiﬁcation of persons held in custody or charged with a crime,
the above discussion demonstrates that “the immediate objective of the searches [is] to generate evidence
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for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that
goal.”260
Therefore, under the Court’s current precedents,
forcibly obtaining and testing DNA samples of arrestees, absent judicial authorization or probable cause for
the search, cannot be justiﬁed under the special needs
exception.

V. Conclusion
This article has discussed the constitutionality of
Virginia and Louisiana’s laws, which authorize DNA
sampling of certain categories of arrestees. Under the
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine of the Supreme
Court, there is little doubt that the intrusions permitted by these statutes constitute searches. And under
the Court’s special needs cases, a very strong argument
can be made, based on the well-known purposes of
these searches, that these procedures cannot be upheld
as special needs searches unrelated to law enforcement
interests. Thus, if the Court were to address the constitutional validity of either or both of these statutes,
an objective analysis of the statute themselves, when
combined with an objective reading of the Court’s precedents, indicates that the statutes should be declared
unconstitutional.261
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Los Angeles Times, Nov. 4, 2004, at 8. Proposition 69 mandates
collection of DNA samples from adults and juveniles convicted
of felonies, sex offenses, and arson offenses, and adults arrested
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for or charged with felony murder, voluntary manslaughter,
or sex offenses. By 2009, the law will require a DNA sample
from every adult arrested for or charged with a felony. California Ofﬁcial Voter Information Guide, Summary and Legislative
Analysis, Proposition 69, at <http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/
bp_nov04/prop_69_legislative_analysis.pdf> (last visited February 3, 2005). The DNA proﬁles will be made available to local,
state, federal, and international authorities. Proposition 69 Text.
On December 7, 2004 the American Civil Liberties Union of
Southern California [ACLU] and other groups ﬁled a class action lawsuit claiming that Proposition 69 violates the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Complaint, Weber et al. v. Lockyer,
et al. (N.D. Cal.), at <http://www.aclu-sc.org/attachments/p/
Prop69_Complaint.pdf.> (last visited January 14, 2005) Some of
the individuals named as plaintiffs included the following: Michael Weber, a San Francisco resident, who was arrested during
an anti-war protest but whose charges were later dismissed. Rodney Ware, a Sacramento County man who, because he was the
victim of identity theft, was arrested on a felony warrant. Because
the actual target of the warrant had used Ware’s name under
false pretenses, the warrant was ultimately found not to pertain
to Ware, and criminal charges were not pursued against Ware.
James Blair, a resident of Alameda County and a user of medical
marijuana. Blair was arrested for offenses related to his possession and use of marijuana, but the charges were later dismissed
after Blair’s physician appeared in court and testiﬁed that Blair’s
possession and use of marijuana were pursuant to the physician’s
medical advice. And Rachel Delucci-Youngberg, a Shasta County
resident who was charged and prosecuted for murder after she
shot her abusive husband in self-defense. Delucci-Youngberg was
subsequently acquitted of the murder charge. Id. at 6-8.
85. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
86. See, Kaye, “DNA Sampling on Arrest,” supra note 83, at 473 (listing these criteria).
87. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). Dionisio held that an
order to produce a voice exemplar for a grand jury’s consideration
did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. “The physical characteristics of a person’s voice, its tone and manner, as opposed to the
content of a speciﬁc conversation, are constantly exposed to the
public…no person can have a reasonable expectation that others
will not know the sound of his voice.” Id. at 14.
88. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting
that individuals “can’t go anywhere or do much of anything without leaving a bread-crumb trail of identifying DNA matter.”) It
should be noted that Judge Kozinski does not accept the claim
that the forcible extraction of DNA does not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment.
89. Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“It is
elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to
submit to photographing and ﬁngerprinting as part of routine
identiﬁcation processes.”)
90. United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968).
91. See infra notes 100-108 and accompanying text. Cf. Kaye, “DNA
Sampling on Arrest,” supra note 83, at 476 (noting that “Dionisio
and cases extending it involve no intrusion into or touching of
private areas of the body and no discovery of information about
the individual beyond the identifying characteristics”) (footnote
omitted).
92. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). For a comprehensive and cogent discussion of
Kyllo and its impact, see “Symposium, The Effect of Technology
on Fourth Amendment Analysis and Individual Rights,” Mississippi Law Journal 72 (2002): 1-1143.
93. 533 U.S. at 34.
94. Professor Kaye contends that “the rationale of Kyllo is quite
limited” and does not dictate the conclusion that DNA sampling
constitutes a search. Kaye, “DNA Sampling on Arrest,” supra
note 83, at 480, n.104.
95. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
96. Id. at 767.
97. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
98. Id. at 606.
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99. Id. at 616-17. Skinner also concluded that the blood tests mandated by the regulations constituted searches. Furthermore,
Skinner plainly stated that the “ensuing chemical analysis of [a
blood] sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of
the tested employee’s privacy interests.” Id. at 616. See also Krent,
supra note 83, at 69 (explaining why “subsequent governmental
use of information may intrude upon privacy far more than the
initial seizure itself, just as the chemical analysis of blood and
urine samples may constitute a greater intrusion into privacy
than the collection of the sample”) (footnote omitted); Scherer,
supra note 83, at 2026 (“[I]t is not the taking of [a DNA sample]
that is the most objectionable search. Rather, it is the analysis
that poses a grave threat to the privacy interests of millions of
Americans.”) Despite Skinner’s plain language, Professor Kaye
insists that Skinner did not decide whether “laboratory analysis
of a legitimately acquired sample is a ‘second search’ and lower
courts have concluded that it is not.” Kaye, “Two Fallacies,” supra
note 83, at 202, n.96 (citations omitted).
100. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. See also Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678-79 (1989) (holding that
“[w]here the Government requires its employees to produce
urine samples to be analyzed for evidence of illegal drug use,
the collection and subsequent chemical analysis of such samples
are searches that must meet the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.”) See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (afﬁrming that “state-compelled
collection and testing of urine, such as that required by [school
ofﬁcials] constitutes a ‘search’ subject to the demands of the
Fourth Amendment.”) See also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist.
of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002)
(holding that “[s]earches by public school ofﬁcials, such as the
collection of urine samples for drug testing, implicate Fourth
Amendment interests.”)
101. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
102. Id.
103. See Kaye, “DNA Sampling on Arrest,” supra note 83, at 482
(“Arguably, Skinner is distinguishable in that urinalysis involves
both the possible revelation of private information and interference with what might be called, for want of a better phrase, ‘excretory privacy.’”); cf. Imwinkelried and Kaye, supra note 83, at
439 (collecting DNA is distinguishable from urinalysis because
the latter “involves a much more extensive intrusion into privacy: the possible revelation of private information, compelled
excretion of bodily ﬂuid, and monitoring the normally private
act of excretion”) (footnote omitted).
104. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 821, n.15 (relying on Schmerber and
Skinner in concluding that the “compulsory extraction of blood
for DNA proﬁling unquestionably implicates the right to personal security embodied in the Fourth Amendment, and thus
constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Constitution.”)
See also Carnahan, supra note 83, at 7-8 (explaining that the involuntary taking of blood and the use of buccal swabs to collect
skin cells from the lining of the cheek are searches).
105. See e.g., Scherer, supra note 83, at 2021. The author notes that
the information obtained from DNA is much more extensive
than the information obtained from the drug and alcohol tests
in Skinner and its progeny. First, unlike drug or alcohol tests
which measure the concentration of a substance at a particular
point in time, “DNA analysis maps immutable, lifelong characteristics of an individual. Indeed, immutability is what makes
DNA such an ideal identiﬁer.” Id. Moreover, while the tests done
in Skinner “garnered information solely about the government
employee, the information revealed in a DNA analysis is not
unique only to that donor. Information from a donor’s genome
also reveals the private concerns of the donor’s parents, children, and siblings.” Id. (footnote omitted).
106. Kaye, “Two Fallacies,” supra note 83, at 187.
107. Id. at 192.
108. Kaye, “DNA Sampling on Arrest,” supra note 83, at 505.
109. Cf. id. at 482 (“As currently practiced,…DNA sampling should be
considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”)
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110. See e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (“Except in certain well-deﬁned
circumstances, a search or seizure is not reasonable unless it is
accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.”)
111. Grifﬁn v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) [Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment]).
112. See e.g., W. J. Stuntz, “Implicit Bargains, Government Power,
and the Fourth Amendment,” Stanford Law Review 44 (1992):
553- 591, at 554; cf. G. M. Dery, III, “Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy than Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller
Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’
Balancing,” Arizona Law Review 40 (1998): 73- 103, at 74 (commenting that under the special needs cases, the “Court assigns
values to the parties’ various needs without any standard weights
or measurements. The resulting subjectivity has created absurd inconsistencies [between the cases].”) See also, Gerald S.
Reamey, “When ‘Special Needs’ Meet Probable Cause: Denying
the Devil Beneﬁt of Law,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 19 (1992): 295-341, at 299-300 (asserting that the Court’s
special needs cases “are individually ﬂawed for failing to adhere
to their conceptual antecedents, and are collectively ﬂawed by
requiring that the Supreme Court interpret the [fourth] amendment in an ad-hoc and unprincipled fashion”). Cf. Kaye, “DNA
Sampling on Arrest,” supra note 83, at 489 (describing the special needs cases as a “relatively recent and somewhat amorphous
category of searches”).
113. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86-87
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that the “majority
views its distinction between the ultimate goal and immediate
purpose of the [governmental search] as critical to its analysis.
The distinction the Court makes, however, lacks foundation in
our special needs cases.”)
114. See, e.g., S. A. Saltzburg and D. J. Capra, (7th ed.) American
Criminal Procedure: Cases and Commentary (2004): at 412.
Professors Saltzburg and Capra explain that in Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), the Court second-guessed the effectiveness of a drug-testing policy aimed at candidates for political
ofﬁce, but note that “such second-guessing was missing in the
Court’s previous cases, and in the subsequent case of [Board of
Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County.
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)]. Saltzburg and Capra also observe
that it is “no surprise that drug-testing cases are all over the map
after Chandler.” Id. (listing lower court rulings with differing
results on the constitutionality of drug-testing of certain employees who perform work for governmental entities).
115. Id. at 431 (after discussing the many special needs cases, asking “[w]here is the line, then, between crime enforcement and
special needs.”) Professor Kaye also notes that lower court judges
“have disagreed as to the applicability of the ‘special needs’ exception to convicted-offender DNA databanking.” Kaye, “DNA Sampling on Arrest,” supra note 83, at 491 (listing cases) (footnote
omitted); see also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832 (plurality opinion)
(upholding suspicionless searches of certain conditionally-released federal offenders mandated by the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726
(2000), under a “totality of the circumstances” test, “[w]hile
not precluding the possibility that the [searches] could satisfy
a special needs analysis”); id. at 840 (Gould, J., concurring)
(upholding DNA testing of federal offenders under special needs
exception); id. at 856 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“primary purpose in conducting searches pursuant to the DNA
Act is to generate evidence capable of assisting ordinary law
enforcement investigations,” which is “the paradigmatic search
condemned by the special needs doctrine”).
116. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
117. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
118. See, e.g., Carnahan, supra note 83, at 15 (describing Edmond as
a special needs case which “casts doubt on much, if not all, of the
reasoning of the prior [lower court] DNA cases, placing some
squarely in conﬂict”); Kaye, “DNA Sampling on Arrest,” supra
note 83, at 490, n.152 & 154. See also, Kincade, 379 F. 3d at 825
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(plurality opinion) (describing Edmond as a special needs case);
id. at 853, n.9 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting) (describing Edmond
and Burger as special needs cases).
119. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
120. Id. at 341.
121. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
122. See id. at 351 (noting that the Court has “used such a balancing
test, rather than strictly applying the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only when we were confronted
with ‘a special law enforcement need for greater ﬂexibility.’”)
(citation omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 352.
125. Id. at 353 (“The special need for an immediate response to
behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and
teachers or the educational process itself justiﬁes the Court in
excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause
requirement, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the relevant interests.”)
126. S. J. Schulhofer, “On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the
Law-Abiding Public,” Supreme Court Review (1989): 87- 163,
at 100.
127. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)
(emphasis added).
128. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
129. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
130. Id. at 538. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (applying principles announced in Camara to ﬁre inspection of a
commercial warehouse). For the classic explanation of Camara,
see W. R. LaFave, “Administrative Searches and the Fourth
Amendment,” Supreme Court Review (1967): 1-38.
131. Schulhofer, supra note 126, at 100.
132. Id. at 101.
133. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
134. Id. at 723 (plurality opinion).
135. Id. at 725 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 [Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment]).
136. Id. at 724 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 [Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment]).
137. Id. (“In contrast to law enforcement ofﬁcials, therefore, public
employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public
employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that
the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efﬁcient
manner.”)
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 725-26. Although Justice Scalia objected to certain aspects
of Justice O’Connor’s plurality, he did agree with her decision to
apply Justice Blackmun’s special needs formula. See id. at 732
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Such ‘special needs’
are present in the context of government employment….I would
hold that government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules – searches
of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the
private-employer context – do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”)
141. Id. at 732 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 742. While Justice Blackmun concluded that the facts presented no special need for dispensing with the warrant requirement, his comments implied that he might be willing to ﬁnd that
certain public employer searches of employees are consistent
with the special needs exception. See also, Schulhofer, supra
note 126, at 101-102 (noting that Justice Blackmun “agreed that
some employer searches could be valid under a diluted standard, but found no ‘special need’ in Ortega itself.”)
144. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
145. Id. at 873.
146. Id. at 874.
147. Id. at 873-74.
148. Id. at 875.
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149. Id. Four Justices dissented in Grifﬁn. Writing for the dissenters,
Justice Blackmun argued that the “need for supervision in probation” presents a special need beyond the normal need for law
enforcement. Id. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Accordingly,
Justice Blackmun argued that a special need justiﬁed a search of
probationer’s home on a lesser level of suspicion than probable
cause, namely, reasonable suspicion. But he would require that
such a search be authorized by a judicial warrant as a means of
“protecting a probationer’s privacy.” Id. at 882.
150. Two aspects of Grifﬁn indicated that a majority of the Court
in 1987 would apply the special needs exception with consider
leeway in favor of the state. First, although the Court ruled that
the search of Grifﬁn’s home was reasonable because, inter alia, it
was done pursuant to an administrative regulation that required
“reasonable grounds” for a search, the facts in Grifﬁn provided,
at best, a “feeble justiﬁcation” for a search. Grifﬁn, 483 U.S. at
887-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that the facts did
not justify a search even under a reasonable suspicion standard). Second, the clear presence of a law enforcement motive
for the challenged search did not negate the applicability of the
special needs exception. As Justice Scalia would subsequently
acknowledge years later, “the special-needs doctrine was developed, and is ordinarily employed, precisely to enable searches
by law enforcement ofﬁcials who, of course, ordinarily have a
law enforcement objective” for their searches. Ferguson 532 U.S.
at 100 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A majority of the current Court,
however, has not embraced Justice Scalia’s position. See infra
notes 186-204 and accompanying text.
151. Schulhofer, supra note 126, at 115.
152. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
153. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
154. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
155. Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 620-21 (quoting 49 CFR § 219.1(a) (1987) [footnote omitted].
157. Id. at 621, n.5.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 621, n.5. (“each sample provided under [the regulations]…
may be available to…a party in litigation upon service of appropriate compulsory process on the custodian”), quoting 49
C.F.R. § 219.211(d) (1987). The revised version of 49 C.F.R. §
219.211(d) omits any reference to making test results available
to third parties in litigation.
161. Id. at 650 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 651-52.
163. Schulhofer, supra note 126, at 138.
164. Professor Schulhofer does recognize that “[r]outine law enforcement involvement [and access to test results], together with
slender or half-hearted regulatory and remedial goals, would
indicate that the administrative features of the program were
merely pretextual. If so, the program would not involve ‘special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,’ and the
probable cause requirement would have to apply.” Id.
165. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666.
166. See Schulhofer, supra note 126, at 140 (“In one sense, Von Raab
presents a stronger case for administrative treatment [than
Skinner] because law enforcement use of test results was prohibited. Von Raab appears to involve a purely employmentrelated program.”)
167. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667 (under the policy, “every employee
who seeks a transfer to a covered position knows that he must
take a drug test, and is likewise aware of the procedures the Service must follow in administering the test. A covered employee
is simply not subject ‘to the discretion of the ofﬁcial in the ﬁeld.’
The process becomes automatic when the employee elects to
apply for, and thereafter pursue, a covered position.”)
168. See id. at 674.
169. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
170. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
171. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 653.
172. 536 U.S. at 830 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 656).
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173. 515 U.S. at 658 (footnote omitted).
174. 536 U.S. at 833.
175. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
176. Id. at 309. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the
majority opinion.
177. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
178. Id. at 84.
179. Id. (footnote omitted).
180. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 319.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 322. Interestingly, in dicta, Justice Ginsburg noted that
“where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket
suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’ – for example, searches now routine at airports and
at entrances to courts and other ofﬁcial buildings.” Id. at 323
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
186. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78. The previous cases Justice Stevens had
in mind were Chandler, Acton, Skinner, and Von Raab. See id.,
at 78, n.12 (citing cases).
187. Id. at 79.
188. Id. at 80.
189. Id. at 82-83 (footnotes omitted).
190. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
191. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion on this point marks a change in the
law. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent, prior special
needs cases had not required the state to establish that its interest was especially important. “Under [previous] precedents, if
there was a proper governmental purpose other than law enforcement, there was a ‘special need,’ and the Fourth Amendment then required the familiar balancing between that interest
and the individual’s privacy interest.” Id. at 325 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). Cf. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81 (“In Chandler,…we
did not simply accept the State’s invocation of a ‘special need.’
Instead, we carried out a ‘close review’ of the scheme at issue
before concluding that the need in question was not ‘special,’ as
that term has been deﬁned in our cases.”)
192. Justice Kennedy voted to invalidate the policy in Ferguson,
but claimed that the majority’s distinction between “the ultimate goal and immediate purpose” of the government interests
pursued, “lacks foundation” in the Court’s special needs cases.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86-87. According to Kennedy, all of the
special needs cases “have turned upon what the majority terms
the policy’s ultimate goal.” Id. at 87. Put simply, in deciding
whether special needs exist in a particular setting, the Court
has always focused on the ultimate goal in carrying out the
search, “rather than its proximate purpose.” Id. As Kennedy
noted, “although procuring evidence is the immediate result of
a successful search, until [Ferguson] that procurement has not
been identiﬁed as the special need which justiﬁes the search.”
Id. at 88.
193. Id. at 81 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44).
194. Id. at 84, n.20. See also id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment) (noting that earlier cases did not sanction “the routine inclusion of law enforcement, both in the design of the
policy and in using arrests, either threatened or real, to implement the system designed for the special needs objectives.”)
195. See id. at 81, n.15 (stating that Grifﬁn “is properly read as limited
by the fact that probationers have a lesser expectation of privacy
than the public at large.”)
196. Id. at 84.
197. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
198. Schulhofer, supra note 126, at 103.
199. Burger, 482 U.S. at 693.
200. Id. at 716.
201. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84, n.21 (citation omitted).
202. Id. (citation omitted).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Saltzburg and Capra, supra note 114, at 419-20.
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206. A good argument can be made that Burger was never intended
to be a special needs case. While Burger makes a single reference to the special needs exception, see 482 U.S. at 702, (after
describing the lesser privacy interests of vehicle dismantlers,
“conclud[ing] that, as in other situations of ‘special need,’”
a warrantless search may well be reasonable), the bulk and
substance of the Court’s analysis is focused on administrative
search precedents. Further, Burger never identiﬁes a particular
“special need” that justiﬁes the suspicionless search authorized
by the statute. Thus, although in a previous article I wrote that
the Burger Court “invoked the special needs doctrine to uphold
a New York law authorizing warrantless, suspicionless searches
of automobile junkyards,” T. Maclin, “Constructing Fourth
Amendment Principles From The Government Perspective:
Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?” American Criminal Law
Review 25 (1988): 669-742, at 735, in retrospect, that description was probably mistaken. Although Burger certainly shares
many similarities to the modern special needs cases, I now
believe that Burger is properly categorized with the administrative search cases.
207. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
208. Id. at 34.
209. Id. at 40. In another passage, Justice O’Connor noted the
Court’s reluctance to “recognize exceptions to the general rule
of individualized suspicion where governmental authorities
primarily pursue their general crime control ends.” Id. at 43.
Standing alone, Edmond appeared to establish a broad rule
against roadblocks designed to serve the state’s “general interest in crime control.” Four years later, however, the Court
demonstrated that the phrase “general crime control” would
not be broadly construed. In Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885
(2004), the Court upheld a roadblock where police stopped cars
to ask motorists for information about a crime that occurred at
the same location one week earlier. Lidster was seized at the
roadblock, arrested for driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol,
and subsequently prosecuted. The Lidster Court distinguished
this roadblock from the illegal roadblock in Edmond because
the primary purpose “was not to determine whether a vehicle’s
occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing
information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others. The police expected the information elicited to help them
apprehend, not the vehicle’s occupants, but other individuals.”
124 S. Ct. at 889. Lidster demonstrates that Edmond’s use of
the phrase “general interest in crime control” does not cover
“every ‘law enforcement’ objective.” Id. (quoting Edmond, 531
U.S. at 44, n.1).
210. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-46.
211. Id. at 46.
212. Id. at 47, n.2; see also id. (“Speciﬁcally, we express no view on
the question whether police may expand the scope of a license
or sobriety checkpoint seizure in order to detect the presence of
drugs in a stopped car.”)
213. Burger, 482 U.S. at 716.
214. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
215. 4 W. R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.7(b) at 709 (4th ed.
2004).
216. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84, n.21.
217. Kaye, “DNA Sampling on Arrest,” supra note 83, at 496 (noting
that “neither Edmond nor Ferguson reaches the more vexing
question of what evidence can be used to infer purpose when
the government contends that its immediate purpose in instituting an investigative practice is something other than (or in
addition to) pure crime control”) (footnote omitted). It is important to note that Edmond’s analysis will not be controlling
in a special needs context. Although the Court’s roadblock cases
are sometimes lumped together with the special needs cases,
Ferguson clariﬁed that the Court’s roadblock cases and special
needs cases are separate doctrinal categories. Ferguson, 532
U.S. at 84, n.21.
218. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44).
219. La. R.S. 15 § 602 (2003) (emphasis added).
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220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See supra note 81.
223. Timberg, supra note 46.
224. Sorokin, supra note 47.
225. Clines, supra note 48.
226. See supra note 50.
227. La. R.S. § 15:602 (2003).
228. Sorokin, supra note 47.
229. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion). See also Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 679 (“Because the testing program adopted by the
Customs Service is not designed to serve the ordinary needs
of law enforcement…[w]e hold that the suspicionless testing
of employees who apply for promotion to positions directly
involving the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to positions that
require the incumbent to carry a ﬁrearm, is reasonable.”) See
also, Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 (in upholding urinalysis testing
of covered railroad employees, the Court stated “[a]bsent a persuasive showing that the FRA’s testing program is [designed to
gather criminal evidence], we assess the FRA’s scheme in light
of its obvious administrative purpose.”)
230. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44).
231. Cf. Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 83, at 154 (stating that
“Edmond and Ferguson raise serious Fourth Amendment concerns with respect to the constitutionality of the data bank laws,
and even greater concerns as to the constitutionality of state
statutes that require DNA from certain classes of offenders upon
arrest”) (footnote omitted). Finally, it should be noted that characterizing DNA searches of arrestees as a “public safety” goal
should not justify application of the special needs exception.
In many instances, the line between “public safety” and law
enforcement is imperceptible. For example, in Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004), organizers of an annual
protest at a military base challenged a police policy requiring all
protesters to undergo metal detector searches. The city argued
the searches were valid under the special needs exception because they keep protesters and others safe by detecting weapons
and other contraband. The court rejected the city’s argument.
Speaking for the court, Judge Tjoﬂat explained that “it is difﬁcult to see how public safety could be seen as a governmental
interest independent of law enforcement; the two are inextricably intertwined.” Id. at 1312-1313.
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speak to the limits of police involvement in probationer searches
in Grifﬁn, but surely there are limits, as is reﬂected by the existing body of law [from the lower courts] on that subject”) (footnotes omitted); Burger, 482 U.S. at 717 (explaining that there
is no “constitutional signiﬁcance in the fact that police ofﬁcers,
rather than ‘administrative’ agents, are permitted to conduct the
[administrative search]”).
242. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)
(explaining that “there was substantial law enforcement involvement in the [search] policy from its inception”).
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244. La. R.S. § 15:607 (2003).
245. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
246. In a similar vein, Edmond left open whether police can establish
a roadblock with the “primary purpose of checking licenses or
driver sobriety [a permissible purpose under the roadblock
cases] and a secondary purpose of interdicting drugs [an impermissible purpose under the roadblock cases].” Edmond, 532
U.S. at 47, n.2.
247. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84, n.21.
248. People v. Burger, 493 N.E. 2d 926, 930 (N.Y. 1986), rev’d, New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
249. Id. at 929.
250. Id. at 930 (citation omitted).
251. Burger, 482 U.S. at 712.
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254. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding the
Virginia DNA collection statute reasonable and rejecting convicted felons’ Fourth Amendment challenge); Roe v. Marcotte,
193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir., 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of
a Connecticut statute authorizing the DNA testing of convicted
sex offenders because the testing was minimally intrusive and
advanced the important state interest of promoting safety by
identifying convicted sex offenders).
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256. Kaye, “Two Fallacies,” supra note 83, at 203.
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258. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 857, n.16 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The
analogy to ﬁngerprinting is ﬂawed in another sense. “[U]nlike
ﬁngerprints, DNA stores and reveals massive amounts of personal, private data about that individual, and the advance of science promises to make stored DNA only more revealing in time.
Like DNA, a ﬁngerprint identiﬁes a person, but unlike DNA, a
ﬁngerprint says nothing about the person’s health, their propensity for particular disease, their race and gender characteristics,
and perhaps even their propensity for certain conduct.” Id. at
842 (Gould, J., concurring). See also Rothstein & Carnahan,
supra note 83, at 156-57 (distinguishing DNA samples from
ﬁngerprinting).
259. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44).
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261. Throughout this article, I have endeavored to provide an objective analysis of the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine. In
light of that goal, the article reaches the conclusion that neither
Virginia’s nor Louisiana’s DNA arrestee law satisﬁes the special
needs formula. If, however, the Court were to actually hear a
challenge to the taking and testing of an arrestee’s DNA, I doubt
the Court will strike down the law on Fourth Amendment or any
other constitutional grounds. Notwithstanding the result and
reasoning of Ferguson, I predict a majority of the Court will be
unwilling to invalidate such a statute. A majority of the Court
will construct a “Good for This Day and Train Only” theory in
order to uphold the search. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112 (2001), is a recent example of this occasionally-used phenomenon on the Court. Knights upheld a warrantless search by
police ofﬁcers of a probationer’s home based upon a reasonable
suspicion that criminal evidence would be discovered. Knights
did not rely on Grifﬁn or the special needs cases, because the
search was clearly related to law enforcement purposes and
conducted without the involvement or knowledge of probation
ofﬁcials. Knight’s holding rests upon what the Court cites as
“our general Fourth Amendment approach of ‘examining the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 118 (citation omitted). Such
a “totality” or “general reasonableness’” model is a standardless formula that permits a majority of the Court to do what it
pleases without having to justify its result or reasoning under
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine.
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